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Nonexistent Problem
RICHARD C.E. BECK*




The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986' introduced a far-reaching and
potentially revolutionary change in the income taxation of the family:
the "kiddie tax.' ,2 Roughly, the unearned income (in excess of the
first $1,000)3 of a child under fourteen years of age is now taxed to
the child at the parents' marginal rate. The stated purpose of the new
rule was to prevent parents from taking advantage of their children's
lower tax rates by means of transferring income-producing capital to
them.
The first section of this article describes the kiddie tax itself and
analyzes the planning choices it presents. The second section criticizes
the new tax as unfairly broad in application, overly complex, and ineffi-
cient. The final section questions whether the purported loophole which
the kiddie tax addressed ever really existed, and concludes that if it
did, it was only because the IRS made no effort to enforce prior law.
The article concludes that enforcement of prior law would have been
a better approach than enactment of the kiddie tax.
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
2. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § l(g) (1986).
3. The statutory amount is indexed for inflation, and the figure for 1995 is $1,300.
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H. Mechanics of the Kiddie Tax
A. The Kiddie Tax Return
A child is subject to the kiddie tax under I.R.C. § l(g) if (1) he
has not attained age fourteen before the close of the taxable year, (2)
either parent is alive at the close of the taxable year,4 and (3) the child
has net unearned income (NUI), which means unearned income in
excess of $1,000 (for 1995, $1,300).' The kiddie tax applies only to
the child's NUI so that amounts beneath the $1,300 floor are either
immunized completely by the child's own standard deduction (the first
$650) or taxable at the child's own 15 percent rate (the next $650).6
The child's earned income is always taxed at the child's own rate.
To the extent that the child has NUI, it is taxed to the child at a rate
which reflects the highest marginal rate of the parent, or more exactly,
it is taxed at the rate which would have been applicable to the parent
had the NUI been added to the parent's own income. Thus, if the child's
NUI pushes the parent's income into a higher tax bracket, that higher
rate is applicable to the child's NUL. The tax on such NUI is called
the "allocable parental tax" (APT) and is calculated by determining
the excess of (1) the parent's hypothetical tax liability after including
the child's NUI, over (2) the parent's actual tax liability ignoring the
kiddie tax.7 This hypothetical calculation does not affect the parent's
actual tax liability in any way.
If there are two or more children whose NUI must be calculated by
reference to the same parent, all the children's NUI must be added to
the parent's income to calculate the aggregate hypothetical increase in
parental tax, and each child's share of APT is proportional to the ratio
of his own NUI to the aggregate of all the children's NUI. 9 This rule
has the potential to push the applicable tax rate even higher.
The "parent" whose rates are borrowed for purposes of the kiddie
tax is the custodial parent if the parents are not married, and if the
parents are married but file separately, the parent with the greater
4. I.R.C. § 1(g)(2).
5. More exactly, NUI is defined as unearned income which exceeds twice the
$500 amount of the standard deduction allowable to taxpayers who are eligible to be
claimed as dependents on another taxpayer's return ($650 for 1995 as indexed for
inflation), or $1,300. I.R.C. §§ l(g)(4)(ii) and 63(c)(5)(A).
6. This amount may be increased to the extent that the child has itemized deduc-
tions which exceed $650 and are "directly connected" to the production of the unearned
income. I.R.C. § 1(g)(4)(A)(ii)(II). This rule will not be further discussed here.
7. I.R.C. § 1(g)(3).
8. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 1(g)(3)(B).
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taxable income. io If the parents file jointly, it is their joint tax which
is the point of departure for calculating the child's APT. This is so
even if the applicable parent has remarried and files a joint return with
a nonparent who was not the source of the child's funds."
If the child's tax would be greater if computed without regard to
the kiddie tax (say because the parent has losses which would be offset
by the child's gains), the kiddie tax does not apply. 12 If the kiddie tax
does apply, the child must file Form 8615 which requires eighteen
lines of calculation.13
B. The Child's Exemption and Standard Deduction
In addition to enacting the kiddie tax itself, the 1986 TRA made
profound changes to the child's personal exemption and standard deduc-
tion. Under pre-1987 law, a child who was claimed as a dependent on
another's tax return (for a deduction of $1,080) was nevertheless enti-
tled to a full personal exemption (in the amount of $1,080) on his own
return. The 1986 TRA raised the personal and dependent exemption
amounts to $2,000, " but disallowed the $2,000 exemption altogether
for a child who was eligible to be claimed as a dependent on another's
return (whether he is so claimed or not).' 5
Pre-1987 law allowed the child the equivalent of a full standard
deduction (then called zero bracket amount) applicable to single taxpay-
ers with respect to earned income, but no standard deduction at all
with respect to unearned income. 16 The 1986 TRA modified former
law by increasing the child's standard deduction to the greater of $5001"
or his earned income 8 (up to $3,000).'9 If the child has both an earned
and unearned income, the first $500 of the standard deduction is allo-
cated to offset unearned income, and any excess standard deduction
is then allocated to offset earned income. 20 Thus, the child is allowed
10. I.R.C. § l(g)(5).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.1(i)-iT, A-13 (1988).
12. I.R.C. § l(g)(1).
13. Unless the parent elects under I.R.C. § 1(g)(7) to report the child's NUI on
his own return using Form 8814. See infra Part I.C. According to the Paperwork
Reduction Act Notice in the Instructions to Form 8615, the estimated average time
needed to learn about the law or the form is twelve minutes, and forty-four minutes
are needed to complete the form.
14. Indexed for inflation, the amount for 1995 is $2,500.
15. Disallowance of the exemption whether or not the child is claimed on another's
return seems unfair; someone should always get the benefit of the exemption.
16. Former I.R.C. § 63(e).
17. The amount for 1995 is $650.
18. I.R.C. § 63(c)(5).
19. The amount for 1995 is $3,800.
20. I.R.C. § l(g)(4); and Treas. Reg. 1.1(i)-lT, ex. 5 (1988).
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to offset at least $500 (ignoring inflation) of unearned income by the
standard deduction.
Taking into account both the loss of the child's personal exemption
and the increase in the standard deduction, however, the overall effect
was to lower the income threshold at which the child must file a return
and pay taxes from $1,080 to $500 (plus any earned income, up to the
allowable limit).
C. The Parent's Election
Halving the child's filing threshold to $500 caused the IRS to estimate
in 1987 that the kiddie tax would require the filing of about 3.7 million
additional returns.2l In 1988, the expected flood of new returns (and
a chorus of complaints about the complication of using borrowed rates)
led Congress to enact the election under I.R.C. § 1 (g)(7) 22 which permits
parents to include a child's unearned income on their own returns.
Compared with filing the kiddie tax return, the election has the obvious
advantage of greater convenience, although it, too, requires the filing
of the new Form 8814 for each child. On the other hand, the election
almost invariably costs more in taxes for two reasons. First, unlike
using Form 8615, the election increases the parent's adjusted gross
income (AGI), and that in turn may trigger a variety of ceilings, floors,
and phaseout provisions which are measured by AGI.23 Second, the
$500 exemption amount and $500 15 percent bracket have not been
indexed for inflation, so that the parent's highest bracket is reached
after including only $1,000 of the child's unearned income, as opposed
to $1,300 (for 1995) using Form 8615.24
21. According to John Ader, Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Taxpayer Service
and Returns Processing, as reported in TAx NOTES, Nov. 2, 1987, at 206.
Because children with unearned income above $1,080 were required to file returns
under prior law, the increase is presumably due solely to children earning more than
$500 but less than $1,080. Income within that spread is subject to a maximum rate
of 15% and is not subject to the borrowed rates of the kiddie tax proper.
22. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §
6006 (1988).
23. For example, the allowable deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions,
medical expenses, and casualty losses is limited to the excess of 2%, 7.5%, and 10%
of AGI, respectively, under I.R.C. §§ 67, 213(a) and 165(h)(2)(A)(1l); itemized
deductions and personal exemptions are phased out for high-income taxpayers in pro-
portion to AGI under I.R.C. §§ 168 and 151(d)(3), and so on.
24. It is unclear whether Congress deliberately intended to exact this price for a
convenience by which it benefits fully as much as the taxpayer, or whether it is only
a drafting oversight. The difference arises as a technical matter because NUI is defined
under I.R.C. § l(g)(4)(A)(ii) which refers to I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) (exemption amount),
which in turn is governed by the indexing provision I.R.C. § 63(c)(4). By contrast,
the exemptions for the election under I.R.C. § l(g)(7)(B) are flat amounts of $500
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Congress imposed some arbitrary limitations on the election as well:
the election cannot be made unless (1) the child's gross income is
solely from interest and dividends (including Alaska Permanent Fund
dividends) ,25 and (2) the child has unearned income over $500 but less
than $5,000.26 It follows from the first limitation that if the child has
even one dollar of earned income, the election cannot be made.2 7 If
the election is convenient, it may be expected that parents will simply
disregard this requirement and conceal the existence of the child's
earned income.28
D. Avoiding the Bite
The simplest way to avoid the bite of the kiddie tax is to make
sure that the child has no more than $1,300 of unearned income. The
maximum tax saving on that first $1,300 is only about $260 in federal
income taxes. The effect of state income taxes should not be overlooked,
however. Only two of the fifty states follow the federal government
and impose a kiddie tax,2 9 so the child may still enjoy a substantial
saving as compared with allowing current income to be taxed to the
parent.
Current income may be avoided until the child reaches age fourteen
in a variety of ways, most obviously including investment in growth
stock which pays no dividends, municipal bonds, U.S. series EE bonds
upon which interest is not taxable until maturity, and so forth. On the
other hand, most of these strategies work just as well for the parent,
and so given a choice, there is no income tax advantage to making
such investments in the child's name. If the child already has capital,
which are not expressly linked to the standard deduction. Thus, the election inevitably
costs an extra $22.50 ($650 - $500 = $150 x 15%) plus the excess of the parent's
tax on $150 over $22.50 (assuming a parental rate of 39.6%, that would be $36.90).
25. Every resident of Alaska receives a dividend of more than $500 per year,
including minor children. The I.R.C. § l(g)(7) election seems to have been enacted
at least in part due to complaints from the Alaska delegation in Congress about the
inclusion of such dividends in the sweep of the kiddie tax.
26. I.R.C. §§ l(g)(7)(i) and (ii), respectively.
27. Apparently it was feared that confusion might result if the child's earned income
were subject to withholding under a TIN different from that of the parent. It is not
clear why that should be any more confusing than comparing Form 1099s for dividends
and interest bearing the child's TIN number, or for that matter Forms 1099 reporting
capital gains (which apparently would prevent use of the election).
28. By the age of ten or eleven, most children probably have some earned income
from babysitting, shoveling snow, and the like, if not from a regular job such as
delivering papers.
29. The two are California and Hawaii, according to Beth Kobliner, Cut These
State and Local Taxes, MONEY, Jan. 1994, at 82.
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however, it may be advisable to revise the investment strategy to avoid
current income.
1I. Design Defects of the Kiddie Tax
A. Overbroadness
The kiddie tax applies to all the child's unearned income from any
source, including sources for whom tax avoidance could not conceiv-
ably have been a motive. Income from gifts from grandparents is subject
to the kiddie tax, for example, even if the grandparents have marginal
tax rates lower than the child or the parents.3° Also subject to the kiddie
tax is income produced by a child's inheritance, life insurance proceeds,
or by investment of a compensatory award of damages for personal
injuries. The latter rule was upheld under constitutional attack in two
cases, Carlton v. U.S.31 and Butler v. U.S. ,32 where the taxpayers unsuc-
cessfully relied upon Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner. Even income from
the child's savings out of his own earnings is included and must be
taxed at the marginal rate of the parents.
Taxation of all the child's unearned income (above the first $1,000)
at parental rates, regardless of the source of the child's capital is clearly
overbroad to the extent that the kiddie tax is justified by the stated
purpose of preventing parental assignments of income. The original
proposal for a kiddie tax in Treasury 134 would have applied only to
30. However, grandparents (and parents) may be motivated by the gift or estate
tax saving offered by gifts of $10,000 per donee per year under I.R.C. § 2503(b).
31. 789 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Miss. 1991).
32. 798 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
33. 284 U.S. 206 (1931) (Wisconsin tax statute held unconstitutional as violative
of Fifth Amendment substantive due process where statute required aggregation of all
family income at progressive rates which resulted in increased tax upon husband who
was liable for entire family tax). Both the Carlton and Butler courts distinguished
Hoeper on the ground that Hoeper involved taxing one person upon the actual income
of another person, rather than merely by reference to the tax rate of another person.
It appears that this distinction is incorrect, however. In Hoeper, the taxpayer had the
option of filing separately and limiting his liability to that part of the (increased) tax
on the aggregate family income which was proportional to his own individual income.
See Ann F. Thomas, Taxing Women's Lives: Taxation and the Economic Identity of
Married Women, at 24 (1995) (unpublished draft on file with the author). The Wisconsin
tax issue in Hoeper at bottom involved borrowed rates, and is indistinguishable from
the kiddie tax cases. Since the general demise of substantive due process, however,
Hoeper is probably no longer reliable precedent.
34. THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, GENERAL EXPLANATION v. 2, at 93
(1984).
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income from parental gifts, and all other unearned income would have
been separately taxed at the child's rates. 3 Both the House and Senate
versions of the kiddie tax followed the Treasury I approach, and would
have allowed the child to set up "qualified segregated accounts" for
nonparentally sourced unearned income to prevent application of the
kiddie tax. In conference committee, however, this selective approach
was abandoned due to fear that sourcing rules would create undesirable
complexity and would lead to administrative difficulties .36 Such fears
may well have been justified. On the other hand, the burden of proving
the child's source of income would be on the child or his representative,
and if he were willing to do the necessary recordkeeping, fairness would
seem to require allowing income which is untainted by any motive of
tax avoidance to be taxed at the child's own rate. This would have
been particularly desirable for income from investment of inheritances,
tort awards, and the child's own earnings. If the kiddie tax could not
be confined to parentally sourced income, it would have been better
to abandon the tax altogether.37
Where the amounts of income involved are large, taxpayers would
probably have been glad to comply with the necessary source ac-
counting rules in order to secure exemption from the surtax. A rela-
tively easy solution to the problem would be to confine the kiddie tax
to high-income children alone who enjoy large amounts of unearned
income from parental gifts, say $10,000 or more.3s This would have
exempted the vast majority of middle-class children from the tax at
an extremely low revenue cost, and imposed the tax only on the
relatively wealthy.
If the kiddie tax had been narrowly targeted at high-income children,
the administrative problems of distinguishing income from tax-
motivated gifts from other unearned income would have been easy to
solve. Families in which children have income of over $10,000 per
year probably receive professional tax advice in any event, and segrega-
35. Also, the tax would apply only after the child enjoyed a full personal exemption
of $2000. Ibid.
36. See Leo L. Schmolka, The Kiddie Tax Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986:
A Need for Reform While the Ink Is Still Wet, 11 REV. TAX'N INDIV. 99, n.21 (1987).
37. The ultimate result of the global kiddie tax was that it falls only upon the
innocent. See infra section II.D.
38. This approach is consistent with the interest-free loan rules, under which there
is a quite sensible exception for gift loans under $100,000 in amount. Thus, middle-class
parents can loan a child up to $100,000 interest free for college or purchase of a home
without becoming subject to tax on imputed interest; and in effect, the rules only apply
to the relatively wealthy.
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tion of the child's parental gifts in an account separate from the child's
other assets would present few problems. Income from other sources,
such as inheritances, tort recoveries, gifts from grandparents, income
from the child's own earned savings, and so forth could then be readily
exempted from the kiddie tax.
B. Complexity
The use of borrowed rates introduces an undesirable degree of com-
plexity and also raises some issues of privacy. Because the child's tax
cannot be computed without first completing the (appropriate) parental
tax return, the kiddie tax necessarily extends the time required to com-
pute the overall taxes. After completion of the parental return, it may
be necessary to recompute it if the parent's election under I.R.C. §
1(g)(7) appears preferable to filing Form 8615. If the parental return
requires an extension, so does the child's return. And if the parental
return requires later adjustment, so will the child's return. Also, if any
one child's return requires amendment or adjustment, this may affect
the other children's taxes by changing their allocable amount of APT.
If the parents are separated but not by final written agreement or
divorce, the kiddie tax must be computed by reference to the higher-
income spouse even if the other spouse has physical custody of the
child. This is likely to lead to situations in which sensitive financial
information may be required by one spouse from the other which may
lead to undesirable friction, inability to complete the tax forms accu-
rately, or both.
Conceptually, the kiddie tax is anything but simple. Children under
fourteen are partly separate taxpayers and partly not, as to both rates
and liability. I.R.C. § 1(g) vacillates among four different notions of
the child-taxpayer:
1. the child is a separate taxpayer as to both rates and liability (over
fourteen);
2. the child is a separate taxpayer as to liability but his rates are
determined partly by his own income (his standard deduction and
earned income);
3. same but his rates are determined partly by his parents' income
(and partly by his siblings' income as well), without feedback
affecting parental tax rates; and
4. the child is a nontaxpayer whose parents are liable for tax on his
unearned income at their rate, with feedback which affects the
parental rate (election).
This is not exactly clear thinking, nor is it simple.
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C. Inefficiency and Noncompliance
As pointed out above,39 the IRS estimated that the new rules would
swell the tax rolls by an additional 3.7 million child-taxpayers. 40 The
Joint Committee estimated the revenue from the kiddie tax would be
$60 million in 1987, $195 million in 1988, $226 million in 1989, $249
million in 1990, and $274 million in 1991.4 For 1988, that meant at
most an average tax yield of $52 per new return. That yield probably
would not cover the costs of preparing and processing the child's re-
turn.42 Many affected taxpayers who became aware of this absurdity
probably exercised self-help and simply ignored the rules. Many others
have quietly unmade tax-motivated "gifts" to their children.
The main culprit is, of course, loss of the child's own personal
exemption of $2,000. Nearly one-half of the Form 8615s filed reflect
AGI of less than $2,00043 and would not be on the tax rolls at all but
for the 1986 reform. Gene Steuerle, who coordinated Treasury I which
initiated the kiddie tax, has explained that the repeal of the child's
exemption was the result of a last-minute search for revenue in the
course of final negotiations over the 1986 TRA, and that nobody was
concerned at that late hour with the complexity this would entail."4
The error of repealing the child's exemption might have been partially
compensated for if the new $500 standard deduction for unearned income
39. Supra note 21.
40. This is a peculiar expectation from government reformers who prided them-
selves on ridding the tax rolls of some 6 million low-income taxpayers. See STAFF,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986 (1987) (the "BLUE BOOK") at 13.
41. H.R. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-881 (1986).
42. The average cost to the IRS of processing a return is $21.50. See Jeffrey A.
Dubin, et al., The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 43 TAX LAWYER at 893, 895
(Table 1) (1990). To that must be added the taxpayer's cost of filing. See Timothy
Baetz, The Indefensible Kiddie Tax, TRUSTS & ESTATES April 19, at 27, 28. Baetz
observes that if a dime must be spent on taxpayer compliance and IRS enforcement
in order to collect a nickel of revenue, the game is not worth the candle.
43. For 1991, 131,364 returns out of a total of 287,777 with Form 8615 showed
AGI under $2,000. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN,
at 76, Table 2 (Summer 1995). For 1987, the figure was 229,117 out of a total 464,691
filed. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN at 28, Table
2 (Summer 1991).
44. Gene Steuerle, How Taxes Become Complicated: The Case of Taxing Children,
TAX NOTES 1519-20 at 45 (12) (Dec. 18, 1989). It is interesting to note that the
lawmakers involved are apparently not anxious to claim any credit for introducing the
kiddie tax. MONEY magazine sought comment from eight of the congressional leaders
who enacted it, but no one wanted to be quoted. "Tax Policy always takes in some
people it wasn't intended to," observed an aide to Republican Senator Bob Packwood.
See Andrea Rock, The Kiddie Tax Nips the Wrong Family, MONEY, Feb. 1988, at
63.
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had been allowed in addition to (rather than instead of) an equal standard
deduction for earned income. Professor Thuronyi, who was one of the
main architects of the kiddie tax, has called this problem the "earned
income trap.", 45 The child's standard deduction is the greater of the
earned income or $650, and that can produce bizarre results if the child
has both earned and unearned income. For example, if a child has $649
of earned income, a return will be required if the child has even five dol-
lars of unearned incomeA6 It makes little sense to tax such a child, as
Professor Thuronyi points out, because children with far greater un-
earned income (up to $650) are not taxed. 7 It also makes little sense to
tax a child with $650 of unearned income who has ten dollars of earnings,
but this too follows from the greater-of rule for the standard deduction
and from the loss of the child's personal exemption. As a practical matter,
unearned income is almost inevitably picked up through information re-
porting on Form 1099s, whereas small amounts of earned income from
miscellaneous chores are very unlikely to be reported or withheld upon
and are probably routinely ignored by taxpayers.
Even the unearned income of children is probably misreported on
a large scale because Form 1040 does not ask the age or date of birth
of the taxpayer or his dependents, nor is such information shown on
Form 1099 for interest or dividends. Thus, even if a parent is aware that
his child should file a Form 8615 for unearned income, the temptation is
probably great to have the child file as if age fourteen or older instead.
IV. Why Have a Kiddie Tax At All?
In a system of progressive taxation, aggregate family income taxes
can be reduced by deflecting income from high-bracket taxpayers to
their lower-bracket family members. In the United States, as elsewhere
in the world, the history of family taxation is largely a tale of attempts
to secure, and counter-attempts to forestall, just such tax advantages.
The steeper the progressivity of the rates, the more there is at stake
in such issues, and the flatter the rates, the less such issues should raise
any concern. For that reason it seems very odd that the framers of the
1986 TRA should have thought of enacting a revolutionary new kiddie
tax in order to protect the integrity of the progressive tax system at
the very moment when tax reform was principally intended to, and
45. Victor Thuronyi, The Kiddie Tax: A Reply to Professor Schmolka, 43 TAX
L. REV. 589, 602 (1988).
46. The tax will fall on four dollars of earned income at the 15% rate.
47. Professor Thuronyi sensibly recommends that the standard deduction be re-
vised to offset $500 of unearned income plus all unearned income up to a total of
$3,000. Thuronyi, supra note 45, at 602.
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did, reduce progressivity by lowering the maximum tax rate from 50
percent to 28 percent. 8
The kiddie tax is all the more surprising when it is remembered that,
as part of the same 1986 TRA, Congress repealed both the two-earner
deduction (which partially mitigated the marriage penalty) and income-
averaging with the explanation that the new flattened rate structure
made the need for relief provisions less acute . 49 The tax advantage (and
potential revenue loss) from assignments of income to children was
similarly reduced for exactly the same reason. Why should a highly
complex new provision be added to combat a "problem" which (if it
existed at all) was diminished in precisely the same way by the simulta-
neous rate changes?
To illustrate, consider that at 1988 rates, the maximum amount which
could be saved by diverting income to a child (absent the kiddie tax)
was about $2,400 per year.50 In order to obtain this maximum tax
saving, the child would have needed taxable income of $17,850 (and
therefore gross income of $18,850) for the taxable year .5 To earn such
an amount of income from investments at, say 8 percent, the child
would require assets of about $240,000. The net saving is an additional
return of only 1 percent, which does not seem great enough to induce
massive gifts of capital.52 Moreover, there may be gift tax consequences
which could well make such a gift a net loss after taxes.
At 1988 tax rates it is all but inconceivable that anyone's sole motive
for gifts to children could be a free ride up the brackets." Under Trea-
48. Though with a bubble under former I.R.C. § 1(g) which created a 33 % bracket
by means of phasing out personal exemptions.
49. BLUE BOOK, supra note 40, at 14-19.
50. That amount is the difference between income which would be taxed to the
child at the 15% rate rather than the parent's 28%. The child's first $500 of income
is taxfree by reason of his standard deduction, and next $500 of unearned income is
taxed at the 15% rate. The effect of the "bubble" is ignored.
51. Above such amounts of income, the child is himself in the 28% bracket and
nothing further is gained by income-shifting.
52. A parent can do much better by keeping the money and purchasing municipal
bonds rather than Treasuries.
53. Except, possibly, for capital gains, on which the 1986 TRA increased the
maximum rate from 20% to 28%. Deflection of capital gains can result in a much
greater tax saving relative to the size of the gift, because gifts of appreciated property
with a zero basis are taxable in full at the lower rate. There would still be the same
limit to the tax saving per child, but the limit would be reached more quickly. Deterring
gifts of appreciated property seems not to have been one of Congress' concerns in
enacting the kiddie tax. Nor should it have been.
The 1986 increase in capital gains tax rates from 20% to 28% was and remains a
highly controversial issue. Although the general problem is outside the scope of this
article, it seems worth pointing out that many countries which do tax capital gains
also provide limited relief for small amounts. Canada, France, and the U.K. all provide
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sury I's proposed brackets of 15, 25, and 35 percent, the maximum
savings from a bracket ride would have been $6,160 (compared to
$12,560 under the 14 percent-bracket system in effect until 1986).' 4
Perhaps Congress simply did not realize that when the final compromise
set the maximum rate at 28 percent," the proposal no longer made any
sense.
56
On the other hand, it might be argued that flattening the rate structure
required broadening the tax base and eliminating loopholes both to fund
the rate reductions and as a matter of principle. The trivial amount of
revenue predicted by the government's own estimate seems to negate
the first reason. As for the question of principle, it is very doubtful
whether the tax saving from gifts to children under former law was a
loophole.
A. Outright Gifts are Not an Assignment of Income
To regard as a loophole the paradigm case for which the kiddie tax
was designed, viz., parental gifts of capital to children, seems contrary
to long-standing principles of tax law. It has always been the law that
assignments of income are disregarded only where the donor retains
some beneficial interest in or control over the transferred corpus. If
the "tree" is transferred outright, and the donor retains no reversionary
interest or rights to enjoy or dispose of the income directly or indirectly,
the transfer shifts the tax on the "fruit" to the donee.5 7
The kiddie tax is also contrary to the long-standing principle that
the individual is the taxpayer, rather than the family.5" Why this sudden
abandonment of two fundamental principles of law? The committee
such relief and simply exempt from tax a limited grace amount of gains. The possibility
of avoiding the first $2,500 of U.S. tax on capital gains per child per year via bona
fide gifts should perhaps be tolerated as a useful safety valve rather than a loophole.
54. See Baetz, supra note 42, at 27, 28. Treasury I did not recommend disallowance
of the child's $2,000 exemption, but assumed the child would not be entitled to any
standard deduction, as was the case under 1985 law.
55. Apart from the artfully disguised "bubble" under I.R.C. § 1(g) which made
the kiddie tax (along with the tax on all other income) more onerous for the middle
class than for the wealthy.
56. If indeed it ever did. Perhaps Congress foresaw the possibility of raising overall
rates in the future, and introduced the kiddie tax in anticipation.
57. This is still true for transfers to a spouse, which constituted the main battlefield
for litigation over such issues before 1948 (when income-splitting was introduced for
joint returns), and for transfers to a child over 13 years of age.
58. Although over 95 % of married couples file jointly, which results in a defacto
system of taxing married couples as a unit, the joint return is nevertheless in principle
elective. Absent the election, the spouses are taxed as individuals, albeit at rates which
are normally unfavorable. The unfavorable rates are due only to marital status, and
unlike the kiddie tax, they are not directly determined by reference to the taxable
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reports and commentaries do not challenge the correctness of these
principles themselves. Instead, the assumptions which seem to underlie
the kiddie tax are (1) that transfers to children are always a sham
because the parents retain control over the income, and by implication
(2) that there are no good nontax reasons for making gifts of capital
to children, so that a presumption of tax avoidance motive is justified.
Both assumptions seem very dubious.
B. Gifts to Children Should Not Be Treated as a Sham
Treasury I justified its recommendation of a kiddie tax by the need to
combat the perceived abuse of parents transferring property to children
without relinquishing control over the funds, thus enabling the parents
both to use the income for the living expenses of the children and to
reduce taxes:
... [U]nder the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA), a person may give
[income producing] property to a custodian for the child (who generally
may be the donor). As a result of the gift, legal title to the property is
vested indefeasibly in the child. During the child's minority, however, the
custodian has the power to sell and reinvest the property; to pay over amounts
for the support, maintenance, and benefit of the minor; or to accumulate
income in the custodian's discretion....
A family whose income consists largely of wages earned by one or both
parents pays tax on that income at the marginal rate of the parents. Even
though the income is used in part for the living expenses of the children,
parents may not allocate a portion of their salary to their children and have
it taxed at the children's lower rates .... Parents with larger amounts of
capital, however, can afford to transfer some of it to the children, thereby
shifting the income to lower tax brackets. 9
Treasury I was incorrect as to both assertions. Under the UGMA,
the donor-custodian may not use income from custodial funds for the
income of another family member. The kiddie tax is not elective (except for choice
of evils between Forms 8615 and 8814).
Note also that if the child's tax would be greater calculated separately rather than
by means of the parents' rate, the higher tax must be paid. I.R.C. § l(g)(1). This,
too, is contrary to the rules for joint returns, under which the spouses are free to file
separately in the rare instances where that leads to a lower tax. The "greater of" rule
of I.R.C. § l(g)(1) seems completely unprincipled: the child is a separate taxpayer
if, and only if, the government would profit.
A general discussion of the individual versus the family as the taxable unit is beyond
the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that the worldwide trend of other
income tax systems has been almost uniformly in the opposite direction of dismantling
complex mechanisms for aggregating family income in favor of taxing individuals
without regard to marital or family status. In this respect, the kiddie tax is a step
backwards into a past which has been rejected by nearly all other countries.
59. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 34, at 92-93. [italics added].
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children's living expenses, and if he does so anyway in violation of
the UGMA, it will not shift the tax to the children. 6° Taking the first
issue first, it is probably true that in the usual case of a transfer under
the UGMA, the donor parent will be the custodian responsible for the
child's investment decisions. 6' Nonetheless, such a transfer is irrevoca-
ble under the UGMA, and the parent custodian is under a fiduciary
duty to manage the custodial funds solely for the benefit of the minor.
The income may not be spent for the donor's benefit. Thus, if the
parent continues to enjoy the child's income as if the transfer had never
taken place, it is contrary to law and may be actionable wrongdoing.62
I know of no evidence for assuming widespread lawlessness of this
kind,63 and the legislative history of the kiddie tax provides none.
It is true that UGMA § 4(b) permits the custodian to pay over amounts
for the support of the minor. However, the case law is very clear that
if the custodian is liable for the support of the minor, he may not use
the custodial funds for the benefit of the minor if it serves to discharge
his own obligation of support and if the custodian has sufficient means
to satisfy his obligation out of his own property." This rule already
prohibits the alleged abuse which Treasury I offered as the rationale for
the kiddie tax, and also undercuts its argument on grounds of horizontal
equity: neither the wage-earner nor the owner of capital can split in-
come in this way.65
60. See infra section III.C.
61. This will bring the custodial funds into the donor's estate however, which
may be an error for purposes of planning for the estate tax.
62. If the transfer is not pursuant to U.G.M.A. or similarly irrevocable, it was
always open to the IRS to challenge the bona fides of the transfer.
63. Except for staffers on Capitol Hill. In 1989, I spoke with a staff member on the
Joint Committee who had participated in the discussions on the kiddie tax. He told me
that before 1987, he personally put money in his children's names and then spent the
income for household expenses, and furthermore that all his friends did the same thing.
When I explained to him that this did not shift the tax under pre-1987 law, he expressed
surprise.
64. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Sutliffe, 489 A.2d 764 (1985), aff'd and remanded on
other grounds 528 A.2d 1318 (1987), interpreting U.G.M.A. § 4(b) (divorced father
may not use custodial funds to pay child support and other expenses of children because
to do so would benefit father, rather than children, by discharging his obligation of
support).
65. A frequently advanced argument in favor of a kiddie tax is that without it,
parents with capital can achieve tax savings which are not available to other taxpayers
who have nothing to transfer, or nobody to transfer it to. That is true. It is just as
true, however, that taxpayers who lack capital cannot make large charitable contribu-
tions, deduct capital losses, buy municipal bonds, make interest-free loans, or earn
interest of any kind. Similarly, taxpayers without children (or employment) cannot
enjoy the child care credit or exemptions for dependents.
The horizontal equity argument assumes what it sets out to .prove. Revenue from
capital is (usually) gross income, just as wages and salaries are gross income. From
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As a practical matter, however, it may appear that there is nobody to
complain about such misuse of the child's funds and that the prohibition
against self-dealing is toothless. This is probably true as long as divorce
does not bring an adverse party into the picture. If the parents divorce,
the donor's ex-spouse may have an incentive to enforce the donor's
legal obligations, and the donor will no longer have the de facto power
to unmake his "irrevocable" gifts. In addition, the donor parent will
probably lose any freedom he might have counted on as custodian of
the child's account to use the child's funds directly or indirectly for
his own benefit, because the other spouse will have an adverse interest
in protecting the child's money. Such a scenario seems especially likely
where the nondonor spouse is the wife and has custody of the child.
She would have an incentive to monitor the husband's performance as
custodian of the child's funds, and if necessary to bring an action on
the child's behalf for an accounting, or a transfer of custodianship. 66
The custodian may be called to an accounting by the child at age four-
teen, and must surrender the principal when the child reaches eighteen,
or twenty-one at the latest.
Divorce also brings a significant risk that the assets of the child
will not be taken into account in fixing the support obligation of the
noncustodial parent.67
Thus, the proposition that parents should be taxed on the income
from gifts to minors cannot be justified by the retention-of-control
argument offered by Treasury I. Control in the limited and nonbeneficial
sense applicable to the duties of a trustee or other fiduciary has never
been sufficient to shift the incidence of tax from the beneficial owner.
To shift the tax, the powerholder's control must provide him with an
actual or potential economic benefit, and this is not the case for legal
that it most certainly does not follow that taxpayers with equal amounts of gross income
are similarly situated. Taxpayers who possess significant amounts of capital are not
similarly situated in any common-sense way to wage earners without savings. As a
policy matter, it may be that returns from capital should be taxed either more lightly
or more heavily than earned income, and the income tax has at various times reflected
both possibilities. The debate over such questions is largely concerned with progressi-
vity, or vertical equity. Horizontal equity should be viewed as requiring only that
similarly sourced income be taxed similarly.
66. This is in fact the typical scenario in which the reported litigation has occurred.
See Sutliffe, supra note 64, and cases cited therein.
67. Under New York law, for example, a judge may not depart from the statutory
minimum child support schedules unless he provides a written explanation of the factors
taken into account in his decision. The statute does list the child's own assets as such
a factor which might be taken into account, but it is purely optional. Also, as will be
pointed out below, if the child's income is actually used for the child's own support,
this will raise the specter of shifting the tax on such income to the parent(s) having
legal responsibility for the child's support.
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gifts to minors. Proponents of the kiddie tax have confused these two
senses of "control" to make their case.68
C. Adequacy of Prior Law to Combat Abuse
If there were in fact serious revenue losses before 1987 from assign-
ments of income through gifts to minors, it is puzzling that the IRS seems
to have taken no steps to stem them by enforcing rules which were in
existence long before the kiddie tax. Income from a minor's custodial
account is taxable to the person obligated for the minor's support to the
extent it is used to satisfy the obligation. Revenue Ruling 56-48469 held
that income from property transferred under the Model Gifts of Securi-
ties to Minors Act which is used to discharge a legal obligation of any
person to support a minor is taxable to such person to the extent so used,
but is otherwise taxable to the minor donee. That ruling was generalized
by Revenue Ruling 59-35770 to apply to the UGMA as well. A similar
rule under IRC § 677(b) has long applied to trusts. The fact that these
rules have apparently never been vigorously enforced casts doubt on the
seriousness of the perceived problem. 71 It is also odd that neither Trea-
sury I nor the legislative history of the kiddie tax even mentions these
support rules, much less discusses any enforcement difficulty in them.72
68. See, for example, Thuronyi, supra note 45 at n.5, "... it is my recollection
that the parental control argument was the primary one adopted by those in charge
and emphasized in discussions with members of Congress." See also Martin J. McMa-
hon, Jr., Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of Children
and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 107-109, 144 (1981) (arguing that the strongest
case for aggregation is where parents have transferred assets because they retain control
or deliberately gave up control, and that there is good reason for aggregation of chil-
dren's income from other sources either on control grounds, or where control is lacking,
on grounds of indirect benefit). Professor McMahon considers third-party payments
for the benefit of a child from an independent trust as an "indirect benefit" justifying
taxation to the parent on the ground that "he is relieved of a social or moral obligation
to provide for the needs of his child." Id. at 108.
The argument proves too much. For example, if a grandparent has superfluous
income which she adds to her substantial savings which the parent reasonably expects
to inherit, the parent is relieved of a "social and moral obligation" to provide for the
grandparent's needs, and in addition, the parent may benefit by feeling safe to spend
on personal consumption rather than saving for his own retirement or the future needs
of his own children.
69. 1956-2 C.B. 23.
70. 1959-2 C.B. 212.
71. Additional doubt is warranted by Treasury's own estimates of the revenue to
be gained from the kiddie tax, see supra section H.C., and from the meager benefits
obtainable under post-1986 rates, see supra section III.
72. Interestingly, these rulings have not been revoked and appear to remain good
law. If the child's unearned income is spent for his support, how do the rulings intersect
with the kiddie tax? Can the rule requiring application of the higher-income parent's
rates to the child's income be circumvented by having the lower-income parent report
the income as the support obligor?
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Some difficulty of enforcement might arise from the fact that provi-
sion of luxuries out of the child's income over and above ordinary
support is in principle not taxable to the support obligor. Aggressive
tax planners had long taken advantage of this exception by limiting use
of the child's income to the purchase of such nonessentials.73 On the
other hand, there is considerable confusion as to the precise extent of
the obligation to support under the law of any state, and to the extent
the rules are ascertainable, they vary considerably from state to state.
There is very little law in any state as to the level of required support
for children within a unified family, 74 as opposed to the obligation of
a noncustodial parent.75
It would be relatively simple for Congress to preempt state law by
enacting a uniform rule for tax purposes that any amount of a minor's
unearned income which is spent for his own benefit is taxable to the
support obligor.76 In any case, the ambiguity in current law does not
explain generally lax enforcement. If income reported by a child is
assessed to the parent, the burden of proof is on the parent to show
that the income was not used to satisfy his support obligation. Some
well-publicized audits would surely have had a deterrent effect upon
abusers. If the old rules had been enforced, the abuse problem would
have disappeared, and income-splitting with children would probably
have been confined chiefly to income which is accumulated, viz., to
socially desirable savings. This would have done no violence to any
principle of current law, and would have obviated any need for the
complex and onerous new tax. In addition, it would have steered taxpay-
ers in the desirable direction of increasing savings.
If administrative measures failed to curb abuse, Congress should
have considered enacting a requirement that unearned income of a
dependent minor must be accumulated in the minor's account as a
condition of taxability to the child, on the analogy of retirement savings.
This would have solved any remaining enforcement problems due to
ambiguity of the support rules by imposing an irrebuttable presumption
73. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WESTIN & ALAN H. NEFF, TAX, ATTACKS AND COUN-
TERATTACKS 71 (1983).
74. It is unclear in most states whether a wife or child has a right to enforce support
from the husband while they are still living together beyond the minimum necessary
to keep body and soul together. A wealthy husband can keep his family in rags while
the family is together, even though the wife and children would receive significant
benefits upon divorce. See Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecti-
cut, 1990 Wisc. L. REv. 807, 852 (1990).
75. See Note, Federal Tax Aspects of the Obligation to Support, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1191, 1203-1206 (1961).
76. See Stanley Nitzburg, The Obligation of Support: A Proposed Federal Stan-
dard, 23 TAX L. REv. 93 (1967).
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that any income currently spent was for support and so taxable to the
support obligor.77 Such a rule would have narrowly targeted the tax
penalty to abuses alone.
D. Retroactivity: The Tax Falls Only on the Innocent
If potential abusers who made spurious gifts solely for the purpose
of tax avoidance are deterred by the kiddie tax from making gifts, the
new tax will fall solely upon the honest taxpayers who made gifts for
socially desirable reasons, and upon children whose assets came from
non-parental sources. Abusers will not be subject to the tax at all. This
perverse result is aggravated by the fact that the tax has a retroactive
effect. Gifts made before 1987 which were legitimately motivated and
which could not be revoked are inescapably subject to the kiddie tax.
Specious gifts for abusive purposes have probably been quietly unmade,
and may escape the surcharge if the parent invests for tax-free income.
Indeed, it appears that the aim of the kiddie tax was not to collect
revenue, but simply to discourage gifts to minors.78
E. Should Gifts to Children be Discouraged?
In the average middle-class family, it seems probable that the child's
savings are prudently husbanded for the future, and ultimately will be
spent on the child's own college education or the down payment for
a home of his own. It may be that if the child had no savings, the
parent would have provided funds for these purposes out of his own
savings instead. If so, the argument goes, the tax saving from unneces-
sary gifts to children before they are grown constitutes an abuse. Per-
haps so, but if that is an abuse, let us by all means have as much abuse
as possible. Savings for such purposes obviously should be encouraged,
and if a modest tax advantage provides some incentive to increased
saving of this kind, it is good tax policy.
There are good reasons for thinking gifts to children do in fact in-
crease savings. It is notoriously difficult for most people to save money,
77. An exception should be made for special medical or educational expenses of
the child related to any disability in order to protect minors who pay for special care
with the income from tort awards.
78. See Thuronyi, supra note 45, who wrote in defense of the tax he devised:
The tax is structured in such a way that parents derive no tax savings and are
subject to considerable hassles if the unearned income of a child exceeds $1,000.
It is reasonable to suppose that, where possible, parents will structure their affairs
so as to avoid this situation. This is easily done. Parents who have placed [wealth]
in their child's name will simply cease doing so...
43 TAx L. REV. 589, 598 (1988).
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and once saved, there are numberless temptations to spend it again.
To the extent gifts to children put savings beyond the reach of such
temptation, as they in fact do under the UGMA, it seems likely that
overall savings will be increased. A parent might raid the child's piggy-
bank for change to pay the delivery man, but he is unlikely to violate
the child's custodial account for an impulse purchase of a car or boat;
and if he does, he may incur an enforceable obligation to make it good
again.
Also, responsible parents will ordinarily invest the child's savings
very conservatively, typically in bank accounts, CDs or savings bonds.
If the parent loses his own money in business or risky ventures, the
child's savings are preserved. For many middle-class people, gifts to
children are probably viewed as a kind of insurance that the child will
have the money he needs for his own future no matter what may happen
to the parents' assets. That is probably the foremost reason parents
(and grandparents) make such gifts to children.79
There are also educational reasons for making gifts to children. There
is no better way to teach a child the value of savings than to provide
some for him, explain how money grows at interest, predict the amounts
which will be available in the future and suggest the uses to which they
may be put if only the savings are never touched. Many parents do
exactly that and inform their children that in addition to the toys which
will soon be forgotten, birthday gifts of cash have been added to their
savings accounts. Many parents also encourage children to make their
own additions to savings.
The kiddie tax penalizes all this, but somewhat surprisingly, it may
have unintentionally done middle-class taxpayers a great boon in the
process. For taxpayers who are not so wealthy as to be disqualified
for need-based scholarships and other financial aid for higher education,
it is far more advantageous to have savings in the hands of the parents
than the student. Colleges (and the government) use a formula to deter-
mine "need" under which the student is expected to spend 35 percent
of his savings each year for college, but parents are expected to use
only 5.65 percent of their savings annually. 80 Those who saved in their
children's names are severely penalized, and those who saved in their
79. The Form 8814 election provides an explicit mechanism for parents to pay
the kiddie tax which they probably always paid anyway (though at a lower rate). Most
parents whose motive in making gifts was to provide savings for the child probably
did not withdraw funds from the child's custodial account in order to pay the kiddie
tax, but instead simply made an additional gift to the child by paying the tax themselves.
80. WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1995, at CI.
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own name as a result of the 1986 TRA were benefitted. It is an ill
wind that blows nobody good.
V. Conclusion
The kiddie tax should be repealed. The justifications originally of-
fered for its enactment were unpersuasive. There was probably never
any loophole to be closed in the first place; the new tax is overbroad
even if there did exist some minor loophole; the tax is a deterrent
to savings; and finally it is complicated and expensive to administer
considering the trivial amount of revenue that it generates.
